

## MODERATION AT LOCAL LEVEL: How Does Post-Islamism Elite Become More Moderate?

Alamsyah Muhammad Djafar  
Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia, Indonesia  
E-mail: [alamsyah@student.uiii.ac.id](mailto:alamsyah@student.uiii.ac.id)

Ahalla Tsauro  
National University of Singapore, Singapore  
E-mail: [ahalla.tsauro@u.nus.edu](mailto:ahalla.tsauro@u.nus.edu)

**Abstract:** The explanation of when and under what conditions post-Islamism elite is more moderate toward democratic values is still up for debate. The majority of studies explain these issues at the national level without taking into account the local dynamics and variety of experiences. Based on a comparative study on Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party or PKS) at the local level (Depok and Sukabumi City, West Java) on the acceptance and repudiation of religious freedom rights, this study argues that moderation is not a linear process and is largely determined by strategic confidence, where the moderation can maintain or even expand their power and influence. This study demonstrates how social pressure, organizational structure, and political experience are interconnected and influence the choice of moderation or immoderation.

**Keywords:** Post-Islamism; religious freedom; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; inclusion-moderation.

**Article history:** Received: 05 June 2023; Revised: 22 July 2023; Accepted: 25 August 2023; Available online: 01 September 2023.

### How to cite this article:

Djafar, Alamsyah Muhammad, Ahalla Tsauro. "Moderation at Local Level: How Does Post-Islamism Elite Become More Moderate?". *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama* 13, no. 2 (2023): 137-164. DOI: 10.15642/religio.v13i2.2464.

## Introduction

Inclusion-moderation assumes that political individuals and groups become more moderate as a result of their inclusion in a pluralist political process.<sup>1</sup> However, the process is not a linear process and uniform. The success and failure of post-Islamism in practicing democracy, including religious rights, as happened in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Iran, and Turkey<sup>2</sup> showed the complex process of inclusion-moderation of post-Islamism in a democratic context.

Studies seeking to understand why Islamist movements and parties have moderated have been extensive. Some scholars argue that the change occurred more due to institutional incentives than ideology.<sup>3</sup> Moderation is just a strategy for post-Islamism groups to achieve their interests, while their Islamic ideology does not change. However, for other scholars, this assumption is seen as something that is not easy. A deeply embedded Islamic ideology cannot simply accept change. The moderation requires “movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives”.<sup>4</sup>

Several studies have explored the further question under what conditions Islamist movements and parties become more moderate.<sup>5</sup> Most of these studies address the issue at the national level and it remains very rare to observe it at the local level. Whereas mapping at

---

<sup>1</sup> Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): p 348.

<sup>2</sup> Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2013); Justin A Hoyle, “A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post-Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring,” *Digest of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 186–209; Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003).

<sup>3</sup> Stathis N Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties,” *Comparative Politics* (2000): pp 379–398.

<sup>4</sup> Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” p 3.

<sup>5</sup> Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties”; Günes Murat Tezcür, “The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors,” *Party Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): pp 69–88; F Michael Wuthrich and Sabri Ciftci, “Islamist Parties, Intraparty Organizational Dynamics, and Moderation as Strategic Behaviour,” *Mediterranean Politics* (2020): pp 1–23; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” *Comparative Politics* (2004): pp205–228.

the local level will provide a variety of information and patterns that may be unique from one region to another.

Studies on *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (the Prosperous Justice Party [PKS]) in Indonesia, the most influential post-Islamist parties today,<sup>6</sup> remains to look at it at the national level.<sup>7</sup> Since the comparative studies at the local level are lacking, this study seeks to fill this gap. Differences in the behavior of the PKS elite who became mayors in Depok City and Sukabumi City, in accommodating democratic values, especially religious freedom, raises a question: why post-Islamism elites in certain areas are more moderate, but not in other areas? In both cities, PKS won the local elections and installed their cadres as mayors. However, in accommodating the values of religious freedom, the outcomes in the two cities are different. The two mayors have different stances toward *Indeks Kota Toleransi's* report (The Tolerant Cities Index).

This study investigates based on the following question: under what circumstances does post-Islamism at the local level become more moderate? We propose a hypothesis that the level of strategic confidence will determine the choice to choose to be moderate or

---

<sup>6</sup> The PKS elite openly acknowledges post-Islamism as a term that can be attached to PKS. The term was conveyed by PKS President Sohibul Iman in 2018 concerning the figure of Sandiaga Uno, who at that time was nominated to become vice president accompanying Prabowo Subianto. According to Suhud Alynudin, another PKS elite, post-Islamism is characterized by an attitude that emphasizes substance rather than symbols Detik.com, "PKS Jelaskan Definisi Santri Post-Islamisme Sandiaga Uno," *Www.Detik.Com*, last modified 2018, accessed June 25, 2023, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4163864/pks-jelaskan-definisi-santri-post-islamisme-sandiaga-uno>.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics," *Party Politics* 19, no. 2 (2013): pp 210–229; Dirk Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party," *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2012): pp 486–498; Yon Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)" (ANU Press, 2008); Ken Miichi, "Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues," *The Muslim World* 110, no. 4 (2020): pp 589–604; Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of Islamist Mobilization in a Muslim Democracy," *Asian Survey* 51, no. 5 (2011): pp 971–992; Noorhaidi Hasan, "New Horizon of Reading Islam and Politics: Post-Islamism in Indonesia," *IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Azazi Manusia* 4, no. 2 (2015).

immoderate. The state of confidence is influenced by the political experience of each elite.

### **Post-Islamism, Moderation, and Strategic Confidence**

Post-Islamism is marked by the characteristics of a movement that seeks to be more moderate through the acceptance of democratic values and mechanisms.<sup>8</sup> They no longer take the strict strategy as before, namely establishing an Islamic state. Post-Islamism represents “an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, and Islam and liberty.”<sup>9</sup>

This change occurs because of the certain failures<sup>10</sup> and exhaustion<sup>11</sup> they have experienced and it appears to form their paradoxical face.<sup>12</sup> Apart from the Iranian revolution which is considered an example of success, this movement was not successful enough to change the face of politics in other countries, especially in the Middle East as experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, The Algerian Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in the 1990 and 1991 elections, and the Islamic Tendency Movement –later changed to the Nahda party- in 1989.<sup>13</sup>

The moderate-inclusion thesis is an explanation to answer why Islamism and post-Islamism movements and parties have become more moderate. The thesis presupposes that exposure to alternative political views and the institutional constraints of electoral competition help moderate extremist parties. These changes appear at the level of behavioral changes due to certain considerations in gaining power<sup>14</sup> and at the ideological level.<sup>15</sup> This last change is a

---

<sup>8</sup> Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*; Ihsan Yilmaz, “Post-Secularism, Post-Islamism and Islam in the Public Sphere,” *Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East* (Leuven University Press, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> Asef Bayat, “Post-Islamism at Large,” in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 29.

<sup>10</sup> Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994).

<sup>11</sup> Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*.

<sup>12</sup> Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism*.

<sup>13</sup> Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 77.

<sup>14</sup> Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties”; Tezcür, “The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors.”

consequence of giving legitimacy and the basis of “a movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives”<sup>16</sup>

Several studies have attempted to further understand under what conditions Islamism became moderate. Wuthrich & Ciftci<sup>17</sup> argue that the strategic change of an Islamist party to moderate is influenced by three factors: (1) party organizational strength; (2) social movement linkages; and, (3) ideological legacy. Kirdiş<sup>18</sup> who studied Islamic political parties (IPPs) in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey put forward two factors, proximity to power and organizational diversity, which are related to moderation and immoderation. The closer IPPs are to gaining political power, they are more likely to choose immoderate in fighting for political agendas to consolidate their political dominance, and vice versa.<sup>19</sup>

Another factor that influences strategic moderation is political learning.<sup>20</sup> This thesis assumes that *strategic moderation* chosen by Islamists is influenced by experiences related to essential conditions such as severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes that they experience. Moderation through political learning occurs in three areas. *First*, changes at the individual level may differ from experiences between political groups. *Second*, changes in several political spectrums and do not always occur in all political spectrums. *Third*, changes at the level of means, goals, or both.<sup>21</sup>

Most of the above studies look at the phenomenon of Islamism and post-Islamism at the national level. There is hardly any research on such contestation at the local level. This gap is also evident in

---

<sup>15</sup> Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, 3.

<sup>17</sup> “Islamist Parties, Intraparty Organizational Dynamics, and Moderation as Strategic Behaviour,” 1.

<sup>18</sup> “Similar Contexts, Different Behaviour: Explaining the Non-Linear Moderation and Immoderation of Islamic Political Parties in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology* (2019): 1–17.

<sup>19</sup> Kirdiş, “Similar Contexts, Different Behaviour: Explaining the Non-Linear Moderation and Immoderation of Islamic Political Parties in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey,” 4.

<sup>20</sup> Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.”

<sup>21</sup> Wickham, *Ibid.* pp 214–215.

studies of Islamic political parties in Indonesia.<sup>22</sup> There is still very little to look at the dynamics and diversity of experiences at the local level. Among those few is Buehler's study of PKS.

Buehler examines the party's inclusion-moderation behavior in local elections, especially the practice of coalitions with nationalist parties or actors.<sup>23</sup> Buehler's study shows that PKS has gradually adopted more moderate behavior not only in national politics, where institutional incentives are conducive to moderation but also in local politics, where the institutional incentives for moderation are weaker.<sup>24</sup> However, Buehler's study has not explored the dynamics of ideological and behavioral moderation outside the context of the local elections.

This study proposes the following hypothesis. Moderation and immoderation strategies are influenced by strategic confidence which describes the extent to which post-Islamist party elites believe that the choice of political moderation will maintain their power, and even expand it. With the opposite logic, an elite who is not convinced on moderation will choose immoderation.

This study also tries to develop the term *strategic confidence* from *victory confidence and stability confidence* developed by Slater & Wong<sup>25</sup> when explaining democratic transitions. *Victory confidence* illustrates that incumbent authoritarian elites believe that they can survive, or even continue to dominate outright, in democratic elections. *Stability confidence* refers to the confidence of the elites that by accepting

---

<sup>22</sup> Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics"; Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party"; Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)"; Miichi, "Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues"; Hamayotsu, "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of Islamist Mobilization in a Muslim Democracy"; Hasan, "New Horizon of Reading Islam and Politics: Post-Islamism in Indonesia."

<sup>23</sup> Buehler, *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics."

<sup>25</sup> *From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia* (Princeton University Press, 2022).

democracy they are still able to maintain political stability and economic development will persist under democratic conditions.<sup>26</sup>

Where does the source of that belief come from? This study proposes three factors: (1) *social pressure*, (2) *organizational structures*, and (3) *political experience*. Social pressure is related to various community efforts to encourage rules and norms that they internalize and socialize through social processes<sup>27</sup>. In a broad sense, social pressure is the efforts of the public to realize the social-politic relations they expect.

Organizational structure is related to patterns and configurations of power management in organizations which are usually made in hierarchical and special units<sup>28</sup>. In a broad sense, organizational structure is related to decision-making patterns and sources of power. The stronger the organizational structure, the more likely they are to choose immoderation.

The last key explanatory (political experience), relates to past experiences of political victory or defeat, including important events such as repression from both the public and the state. This study also develops the term from political learning by Wickham.<sup>29</sup> He defines political learning as “the process in which people modify their political beliefs and tactics due to important conditions such as severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes”.<sup>30</sup>

## Method

This study uses a comparative study by comparing PKS in two cities in West Java: Depok City and Sukabumi City. West Java was chosen with the consideration that a number of reports on freedom of religion/belief often place West Java as the province with the highest cases of intolerance in Indonesia. In addition, the selected two

---

<sup>26</sup> Slater and Wong, *From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia*, p 4.

<sup>27</sup> Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, and Christopher W Larimer, “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment,” *American political science review* 102, no. 1 (2008): pp 33–48.

<sup>28</sup> Hongseok Lee, “The Implications of Organizational Structure, Political Control, and Internal System Responsiveness on Whistleblowing Behavior,” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 40, no. 1 (2020): pp 155–177.

<sup>29</sup> “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.”

<sup>30</sup> Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” pp 214–215.

cities are highly considered in this study due to both local governments were led by PKS cadres.

Methodologically, comparison at the local or subnational level has several advantages, including helping researchers to deal with the unequal spatial nature of the main processes of political and economic transformation. This method can also overcome the limited number of observations and make controlled comparisons.<sup>31</sup>

This research uses *the Most Similar Systems Design* (MSSD) method. It contains a means “to compare political systems that share a host of common features to neutralize some differences while highlighting others”.<sup>32</sup> This method refers to the “method of difference” developed by John Stuart Mill which identifies different political outcomes from the same features. This method usually studies two very similar cases. Differences emerge in the variables whose relationship to each other is being studied.<sup>33</sup>

This study examines the key explanatory factors: (1) *social pressure*; (2) *organizational structures*; and (3) *political experience*. Among these similarities, the outcome of political moderation is different. While The city of Sukabumi can be considered more moderate towards issues of religious freedom, the trend on Depok City shows the otherwise. This research data consists of the latest regional election results, media articles, and scholarly literature on Islamism and political Islam.

### **Local Post-Islamist in Indonesia and Its Dynamic**

Currently, PKS is the strongest post-Islamist party in Indonesia. In the 1999 election, PKS won 1.43 million votes equaled to 1.36 % of the total national valid votes. In 2019, the vote increased significantly to 11.49 million votes or 8.21%. This party was ranked seventh for the party with the highest vote gain. In the House of Representatives, they earned 50 seats.<sup>34</sup> Another Islamist parties such

---

<sup>31</sup> Richard Snyder, “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method,” *Studies in comparative international development* 36 (2001): p 93.

<sup>32</sup> Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, Second. (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p 28.

<sup>33</sup> Jonathan Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 291.

<sup>34</sup> Katadata.co.id, “Ini Perolehan Suara PKS Dalam Pemilu 1999-2019,” *Www.Katadata.Co.Id*, last modified 2022, accessed June 23, 2023,

as *Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan* (Unity and Development Party [PPP]) was rated ninth position with 6.3 million votes (4.52 %) and *Partai Bulan Bintang* (the Crescent Star Party [PBB]) was ranked 13th with 1.9 million votes (0.79%).<sup>35</sup>

In some provinces and cities or districts, PKS won regional head and regional legislative elections. In the 2005-2008 regional head elections, regional head candidates relying on a single ticket from PKS won four local elections in districts and municipalities: West Bangka, Bekasi, Depok City and Pariaman City.<sup>36</sup> As many as 115 districts and municipalities, PKS has formed a coalition with secular-nationalist parties, and 4 districts and municipalities have formed a coalition with Islamist parties.<sup>37</sup>

PKS' current significant achievements cannot be separated from its ability to choose strategic moderation by raising issues such as anti-corruption and good governance.<sup>38</sup> They also claim to protect human rights and empower women.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, PKS maintains conservative issues and religious sentiments can broaden their voters.

PKS support for both Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno in the 2019 Presidential election can be regarded as one of the determinant factors that increased their votes. Not only at the

---

<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/06/17/ini-perolehan-suara-pks-dalam-pemilu-1999-2019>.

<sup>35</sup> Kompas.com, "Hasil Pemilu 2019: Persentase Suara Dan Jumlah Kursi Parpol," *Www.Kompas.Com*, last modified 2022, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/06/21/06150031/hasil-pemilu-2019--persentase-suara-dan-jumlah-kursi-parpol>.

<sup>36</sup> B Setiawan, "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Mosaik Pluralitas Islam Perkotaan," *Kompas*, no. 24 March (2009): 8.

<sup>37</sup> Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics," p 218.

<sup>38</sup> Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics"; Miichi, "Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues"; Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party."

<sup>39</sup> Miichi, "Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues," p 590.

national level, but also in many regions. The two events above cannot be separated from *Aksi Bela Islam* (the Islamic Defense Action). It connects various interests, both from the secular-nationalist elite and masses such as *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (The Great Indonesia Movement Party) known as Gerindra and *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party), as well as the conservative Muslim groups such as members of *Front Pembela Islam* (the Islamic Defenders Front [FPI]). Some of the masses involved in the action were also affiliated with the largest religious organization such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*.

At the local level, PKS' experience of being more moderate or immoderate is not uniform. The dynamics of PKS elites and organizations in Depok City and Sukabumi City show that moderation does not run linearly. In both cities, PKS won the local elections and installed their cadres as mayors. In Depok City, Mohammad Idris-Imam Budihartono, the two PKS cadres have become Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Depok for the 2021-2026 period.<sup>40</sup> Previously, Abdus Somad was paired with Gerindra politician Pradi Supriatna as mayor-deputy mayor of Depok for the 2016-2021 period.<sup>41</sup>

In the 2019 local election, PKS won the majority of votes and succeeded in winning its cadres as mayor. Of the 50 seats, PKS won 12 seats with 180,219 votes. The acquisition defeated the ruling party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).<sup>42</sup> Since 2006, the mayor of Depok has been led by PKS cadres.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> CNN Indonesia, "Taring PDIP-Gerindra Gagal Robohkan Benteng PKS Di Depok," *Www.Cnnindonesia.Com*.

<sup>41</sup> Republika.co.id, "Aher Lantik Enam Bupati/Wali Kota Pemenang Pilkada," *Www.Republika.Co.Id*, last modified 2016, accessed June 4, 2023, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/16/02/17/o2odfm301-aher-lantik-enam-bupatiwali-kota-pemenang-pilkada?>

<sup>42</sup> Kompas.com, "PKS Kuasai Kursi DPRD Kota Depok," *Www.Kompas.Coms*, last modified 2019, accessed June 5, 2023, <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2019/05/20/06122931/pks-kuasai-kursi-dprd-kota-depok?page=all#:~:text=Jumlah suara PKS di Depok,PDI-P memperoleh 165.479 suara.>

<sup>43</sup> VOI, "Hampir 20 Tahun PKS Berkuasa Di Depok, Charta Politik Ungkap Analisisnya," *Www.Voi.Id*, last modified 2020, accessed June 5, 2023, <https://voi.id/berita/22543/hampir-20-tahun-pks-berkuasa-di-depok-charta-politika-ungkap-analisisnya.>

In Sukabumi City, Achmad Fahmi became the mayor of Sukabumi 2018–2023 with the support of PKS and *Partai Demokrat*. Previously, this PKS cadre became the deputy mayor of Sukabumi for the 2013–2018 period.<sup>44</sup> The mayor is held by Democrat Party cadres. PKS's vote acquisition in the 2019 regional legislative elections was in third place which also earn five seats.<sup>45</sup>

However, in accommodating religious freedom issues, the outcomes in the two cities are different. Religious freedom is “the free exercise of religion and that all religions must be treated equally”.<sup>46</sup> This fundamental right is guaranteed by international instruments such as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).<sup>47</sup> It is guaranteed also in the Indonesian constitution and some regulations.

This study measured the acceptance of religious freedom values by to what extent the mayors of Depok and Sukabumi implement indicators of The Tolerant Cities Index (Indeks Kota Toleransi, IKT) which was developed by a non-governmental organization Setara Institute. In IKT 2022, Setara Institute placed Sukabumi City in sixth place as the most tolerant city. Meanwhile, Depok City ranked the second as the most intolerant city.<sup>48</sup>

In his speech accepting the award in 2022, The Mayor of Sukabumi City Achmad Fahmi contended that tolerance is a manifestation of religious teachings. According to him, in Islam, the state has two responsibilities: *first*, how the state is present within the

---

<sup>44</sup> Kompas.id, “Wali Kota Sukabumi Achmad Fahmi,” *Www.Kompas.Id*, last modified 2022, accessed June 5, 2023, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/tokoh/2022/01/20/wali-kota-sukabumi-achmad-fahmi>.

<sup>45</sup> Sukabumikota.go.id, “Berita Acara Penetapan Perolehan Kursi Partai Dan Calon Terpilih Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kota Sukabumi,” *Wwww.Portal.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*, last modified 2019, accessed June 4, 2023, <https://portal.sukabumikota.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BA-055-CAP.pdf>.

<sup>46</sup> Jonathan Fox, “Religious Freedom in Theory and Practice,” *Human Rights Review* 16 (2015): p 4.

<sup>47</sup> OHCHR, “Freedom of Religion,” *Wwww.Ohchr.Org*, last modified 2023, accessed May 3, 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/freedom-religion>.

<sup>48</sup> Setara Institute, “Indeks Kota Toleran (IKT) 2022” (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2023), [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U\\_XseSoHCigJ37iSxXAFOvdSILn\\_BIzz/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U_XseSoHCigJ37iSxXAFOvdSILn_BIzz/view).

framework of providing a sense of security and comfort for adherents of religions; *second*, prosperity with various potentials, both in education and economy.<sup>49</sup>

On the other hand, the Mayor of Depok, Muhammad Idris, stated that the results of the research did not match the reality in Depok City, which he claimed was in a state of peace. He also considered the case of the sealing of the Ahmadiyya mosque in Depok to be irrelevant when used as an assessment indicator<sup>50</sup>. A similar view was conveyed by the spokesperson for the PKS.<sup>51</sup>

As will be explained later, despite having a number of factors in common, the resulting outcomes are different. In both cities, their organizational structure is very strong. The only difference is in political experience. PKS has long experience in ruling by placing their cadres as mayors. While in the city of Sukabumi, the party can be considered a new player, with experience only for five years. PKS in Depok City holds the majority of seats in the DPRD, while in Sukabumi City it occupies in the third position.

*Table 1*  
*Explanatory Factor and Outcome*

	<b>Depok City</b>	<b>Sukabumi City</b>
Key Explanatory Factor		
Social pressure	High	High
Organizational structure	Strong	Strong
Political experience	Strong	Low
Outcome	Moderation	Immoderation

### **Social Pressure and Moderation**

Islamist movements and parties in many countries are known for their rigid ideology and rejection of the democratic system. This

<sup>49</sup> Sukabumi Kota, “Kota Sukabumi Raih Penghargaan Kota Toleran Se-Indonesia Peringkat Ke-6,” *Www.Kdp.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*, last modified 2023, accessed June 4, 2023, <https://kdp.sukabumikota.go.id/2023/04/kota-sukabumi-raih-penghargaan-kota.html>.

<sup>50</sup> Kompas.com, “Sederet Alasan Wali Kota Idris Sanggah Depok Kota Paling Intoleran...,” *Www.Kompas.Com*, last modified 2023, accessed June 4, 2023, <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2023/04/12/10084891/sederet-alasan-wali-kota-idris-sanggah-depok-kota-paling-intoleran?page=all>.

<sup>51</sup> CNN Indonesia, “Depok Disebut Kota Intoleran Nomor Dua, PKS Ragukan Riset Setara,” *Www.Cnnindonesia.Com*, last modified 2023, accessed June 5, 2023, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230407171122-32-934912/depok-disebut-kota-intoleran-nomor-dua-pks-ragukan-riset-setara>.

situation creates a negative image for them and creates challenges in extending support. These views are socially constructed and broadcasted through massive media coverage both at local and abroad.

PKS also faced this situation. This party is considered a threat to democracy. Their political actions and attitudes are seen as growing segregation and intolerance, especially towards minority groups. That view is not all supported by evidence. If PKS is considered a party whose concerns on carrying Islamic law through regional policies, in fact, 121 out of 114 regional heads supported by PKS have not issued *shari'a* regulations.<sup>52</sup> Some of the *shari'a* regulations are driven by nationalist-based parties such as *Partai Golongan Karya* (Work Group Party) and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDIP).<sup>53</sup>

Among the elite of the large religious organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, they are even considered rivals because they promote different ideologies and political attitudes.<sup>54</sup> The peak of the competition between PKS and Muhammadiyah occurred when the Muhammadiyah Central Board issued an official letter banning PKS activities within Muhammadiyah in the name of *da'wa* in 2006. The letter issued along with the struggle for the management of Muhammadiyah mosques by PKS activists in various regions across Indonesia.<sup>55</sup>

Within NU, PKS is considered an Islamic party that carries a Salafi-Wahhabi ideology that is different from their religious views. This ideology is characterized by the doctrine of rejecting religious practices considered *bid'ah* (religious innovation). NU is a religious organization that maintains and revives local traditions such as *tablil*

---

<sup>52</sup> Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics."

<sup>53</sup> Robin Bush, "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?," in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Sally White Greg Fealy (Pasir Panjang: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 174–191; Michael Buehler, "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces," *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 1 (October 1, 2013): 63–82, <http://openurl.ingenta.com/content/xref?genre=article&issn=0010-4159&volume=46&issue=1&spage=63>.

<sup>54</sup> Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)," 169.

<sup>55</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009), 180.

(the tradition of praying and commemorating for the dead). In the Salafi-Wahhabi doctrine, *tablil* is generally considered heresy. For NU elites and young cadres, PKS is also seen as a party that has the goal of building the formalization of Islam in Indonesia.

The negative image above is a form of public pressure that PKS also faces in Sukabumi City and Depok City. For some, discriminatory policies against minority groups in Depok City show the true ideology of PKS. This issue generally is raised by civil society organizations that concern on tolerance and human rights, among others, statement to carry out raids on the LGBT community in 2020,<sup>56</sup> sealed the Ahmadiyya Mosque (2020), banned Valentine's Day celebrations in 2021 and 2022, and submitted a draft Religious City regional regulation in 2022.<sup>57</sup>

In Sukabumi City, plenty of intolerant cases have emerged including the attack and sealing of the Ahmadiyya mosque. In 2017, the Coordinating Body for Supervision of Community Beliefs (Bakorpakem) sealed the Bilal Mosque on Jalan Sriwedari, Cikole District.<sup>58</sup> This is not a new policy. In 2013, the District Attorney for the City of Sukabumi sealed the mosque. The sealing was witnessed by the Chairman of the Sukabumi City MUI, the Head of the Sukabumi City Police AKBP, and the Mayor of Sukabumi. The mosque burned down by a mob in April 2008.<sup>59</sup> In Fachmi period, there were programs considered as state favoritism policies such *Gerakan Magrib Mengaji* (the Magrib recitation movement) and *Gerakan Shalat Berjemaah* (the congregational prayer).<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup> BBC Indonesia, "Komunitas LGBT 'melawan' Pernyataan Wali Kota Depok: 'Ini Rumah Kami, Saya Harus Bertahan,'" *Www.Bbc.Com*, last modified January 17, 2020, accessed April 16, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-51116965>.

<sup>57</sup> Tempo.co, "Perda Kota Religius Kota Depok Ditolak, Pemprov Jawa Barat Sudah Beri Sinyal Sejak Januari," *Www.Tempo.Co*, last modified 2022, accessed April 16, 2023, <https://metro.tempo.co/read/1641537/perda-kota-religius-kota-depok-ditolak-pemprov-jawa-barat-sudah-beri-sinyal-sejak-januari>.

<sup>58</sup> Sukabumiupdate.com, "Bakorpakem: Penutupan Masjid Bilal Ahmadiyah Kota Sukabumi Kewenangan Pusat," *Www.Sukabumiupdate.Com*, last modified 2017, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://www.sukabumiupdate.com/peristiwa/29481/bakorpakem-penutupan-masjid-bilal-ahmadiyah-kota-sukabumi-kewenangan-pusat>.

<sup>59</sup> Liputan6.com, "Masjid Ahmadiyah Di Sukabumi Dibakar," *Www.Liputan6.Com*, last modified 2008, accessed June 28, 2023, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/158551/masjid-ahmadiyah-di-sukabumi-dibakar>.

<sup>60</sup> Setara Institute, "Indeks Kota Toleran (IKT) 2022."

The cases that occurred in the two cities have become the spotlight of organizations working on issues of human rights and freedom of religion. Among them are the Setara Institute, the Wahid Foundation, and Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation). At the international level, cases in the two cities were reported by international NGOs through international human rights mechanisms. For instance, Amnesty International and Aliansi Jurnalis Indonesia (the Alliance of Indonesian Journalists) raised the Ahmadiyya Case in Depok in their report for Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in November 2022.<sup>61</sup> In 2017, the USA Embassy in Indonesia also included cases of violations in the two cities as material for its 2017 religious freedom report.<sup>62</sup>

Apart from international pressure, the mayor also faced pressure from the local community from PKS cadres. In Sukabumi, the Gusdurian Network, a community built to carry on the ideas and struggles of KH Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gusdur, voiced the importance of tolerance. According to the Gusdurian Network, the award as a Tolerant City 2022 must be proven by providing more open spaces for young people and interfaith communities.<sup>63</sup>

### **Organizational Structure and Moderation**

PKS has been known for a strict and hierarchical organizational structure. The system of recruitment and promotion in this party has been developed based on merit. The party that was first born under the name of the Justice Party is also known to have a strong ideological foundation.<sup>64</sup>

PKS was born from Jemaah Tarbiyah, an urban Muslim community movement in the 1980s and took inspiration from

---

<sup>61</sup> Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Dan Aliansi Jurnalis Independen: Laporan Kepada Sesi Ke-41 Kelompok Kerja UPR (UPR Working Group)* (Jakarta, 2022), <https://www.amnesty.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/UPR-Indonesian.pdf>.

<sup>62</sup> US Embassy Indonesia, *2017 International Religious Freedom Report* (Jakarta, 2017), <https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/official-reports/2017-international-religious-freedom-report/>.

<sup>63</sup> Sukabumihalojabar.com, "Sukabumi Kota Toleran, Gusdurian Beri Catatan," *Www.Sukabumihalojabar.Com*, last modified 2023, accessed June 24, 2023, <https://sukabumi.halojabar.com/sukabumi-kota-toleran-gusdurian-beri-catatan/>.

<sup>64</sup> Hamayotsu, "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of Islamist Mobilization in a Muslim Democracy," p 149.

Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt.<sup>65</sup> The cadres and supporters are more likely urban Muslims who live in Jakarta, Depok and Bekasi City, and other big cities such as Bandung. Majority of its followers are graduated from renowned university. The state university has become the center of recruitment and movement of Jamaah Tarbiyah through religious activities and offering a scholarship.

From the organizational structure, the *Majelis Syuro* (Syuro Council) has a very big role. This institution is filled with respected party elites who have authority starting from formulating the party's vision and mission, choosing the Party's Central Leadership and making other strategic decisions. In addition to the regional leadership councils, at the regional level there is Dewan Syariah Daerah (the Regional Sharia Council) for the provincial level and the Ethics Council for the district/city level. Two organizations serve to enforce party rules.<sup>66</sup>

In Depok and Sukabumi City, party decisions are obeyed and determined through decision-making forums such as Regional Conferences (Musda). In 2020, Musda appointed Imam Budi Hartono Setiawan as Chairman of the DPD for the 2020-2023 period.<sup>67</sup> In the 2020 local elections, Imam was elected Deputy Mayor of Depok accompanying Muhammad Idris as mayor. Imam is a PKS cadre who has been ranking from the bottom since 1998. In that year, he was elected as Chairman of the Leadership Council of the Beji Depok Justice Party Branch.

At the beginning of its development, PKS established a policy that only Muslims from tarbiyah cadres could officially become party cadres.<sup>68</sup> However, the policy was amended along with other moderation measures such as accepting female leadership and even accepting non-Muslim legislative candidates.

---

<sup>65</sup> Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jamaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)."

<sup>66</sup> Sekjen DPP PKS, "Anggaran Dasar Dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Keadilan Sejahtera" (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2021), [https://pks.id/dotAsset/fcd26600-66a4-4d26-a265-25cdc3b59165?force\\_download=true](https://pks.id/dotAsset/fcd26600-66a4-4d26-a265-25cdc3b59165?force_download=true).

<sup>67</sup> Antaranews.com, "Pengurus PKS Depok 2020-2025, Siap Tambah Suara Dua Kali Lipat," *Www.Antaranews.Com*, last modified 2021, accessed June 25, 2023, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2011188/pengurus-pks-depok-2020-2025-siap-tambah-suara-dua-kali-lipat>.

<sup>68</sup> Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party," pp 11–12.

Unlike Imam, Idris is not a PKS cadre who started his political career from the bottom. But the party's decision stipulated him as a candidate for deputy mayor accompanying PKS cadres and figures, Nurmahmudi Ismail, for the second period (2011-2015). In 2016, PKS nominated Idris to become the mayor of Depok in the local elections.

Within PKS, the names of alumni from Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor and Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, competed with names from tarbiyah cadres such as Tifatul Sembiring, Imam Budi Hartono, and Sohibil Iman.<sup>69</sup> However, a decision at the elite level between PKS and Gerindra finally determined that Muhammad Idris (PKS) and Pradi Supriatna (Gerindra) were appointed as candidates for mayor and deputy mayor. They are supported by the Pelangi Coalition consisting of the PKS, Gerindra, Demokrat and PBB parties.

In Sukabumi, Abdul Fatah Firman Fauzi was appointed chairman of the DPD for the 2020-2025 period. The chairman of the Regional Advisory Council (DPW) is occupied by Achmad Fahmi who is also serving as the mayor of Sukabumi.<sup>70</sup> The election of Abdul Fatah is reportedly related to the closeness of Asep Tajul, the previous chairman of DPD PKS, with *Partai Gelombang Indonesia Raya* (the Great Indonesia Wave Party [Gelora]).<sup>71</sup> Gelora is a party founded mostly by PKS cadres and currently led by the former chairman of the PKS, Anis Matta.

Achmad Fahmi joined the PKS and was nominated as a member of DPRD 2004-2009. He escaped and returned in the next period (2009-2013). In the 2013 mayoral election, PKS appointed him as a candidate for deputy mayor, accompanying Democratic cadre Mohammad Muraz. In the following period (2018-2023), the alumni

---

<sup>69</sup> Kompas.com, "PKS: Tifatul Sembiring Kandidat Calon Wali Kota Depok," *Www.Kompas.Com*, last modified 2014, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/08/25/12423491/PKS.Tifatul.Sembiring.Kandidat.Calon.Wali.Kota.Depok>.

<sup>70</sup> Radarsukabumi.com, "Inilah Kepengurusan Baru DPD PKS Kota Sukabumi," *Www.Radarsukabumi.Com*, last modified 2020, accessed June 24, 2023, <https://radarsukabumi.com/berita-utama/inilah-kepengurusan-baru-dpd-pks-kota-sukabumi/>.

<sup>71</sup> Republika.co.id, "Penggantian Ketua DPD PKS Sukabumi Tak Terkait Partai Gelora," *Www.Republika.Co.Id*, last modified 2019, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/q151s4428/penggantian-ketua-dpd-pks-sukabumi-tak-terkait-partai-gelora>.

of the Futuhiyyah Islamic boarding school, Pacet, Cianjur Regency, was running for mayor of Sukabumi paired with Andri Setiawan Hamami. Andri's older brother, Marwan Hamami (Golkar cadre), served as Sukabumi Regent for two terms (2016-2026).

With a strong organizational and ideological structure, party decisions at both the local and national levels can be carried out more effectively. It is also influenced by the strategies they have developed so far, including the missionary movement and regular recitations, mentoring educational institutions; and cooperation with other community institutions and organizations.<sup>72</sup>

This strength is shown by the obedience of the party cadres and supporters in holding mass actions. In 2010, PKS deployed more than a thousand people consisting of cadres and sympathizers from the city and regency of Sukabumi in front of the Great Mosque of Sukabumi City. They voiced their defense of Palestine and condemned Israel's actions.<sup>73</sup> In September 2022, the PKS Sukabumi deployed a thousand masses to reject the increasing price of fuel oil. Apart from Sukabumi, similar actions were carried out by parties in all regions, including in Depok. They claim to drop a thousand mobs at eleven points. They also spread-out banners of rejection against central government policy to increase the price of fuel oil.<sup>74</sup>

### **Political Learning and Strategic Confidence**

The experience of being in power and the strong network among cadres are striking things that distinguish the PKS dynamics in Depok and Sukabumi City. For 20 years, PKS has always succeeded in winning regional head elections and placing its cadres as mayors. For instance, started by Nurmahmudi Ismail (2006-2016) and continued by Mohammad Idris (2016-2023).

---

<sup>72</sup> Muhammad Nuh Ismanu and Chusnul Mar'iyah, "Faktor-Faktor Internal Kemenangan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Dalam Pemilihan Anggota DPRD Kota Depok Tahun 2019," *Politicon: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 3, no. 1 (2021): 34–59.

<sup>73</sup> Republika.co.id, "Seribu Massa PKS Sukabumi Dukung Palestina," *Www.Republika.Co.Id*, last modified 2010, accessed June 24, 2023, <https://republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nusantara/10/03/21/107399-seribu-massa-pks-sukabumi-dukung-palestina>.

<sup>74</sup> Tribunnews.com, "Tolak Harga BBM Naik, PKS Depok Gelar Flashmob Di 11 Titik, Dibentangkan Di Jalan Merdeka Sukmajaya," *Www.Tribunnews.Com*, last modified 2022, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://depok.tribunnews.com/2022/09/10/tolak-harga-bbm-naik-pks-depok-gelar-flashmob-di-11-titik-dibentangkan-di-jalan-merdeka-sukmajaya>.

In the 2015 election, the pair Mohammad Idris and Pradi Supriatna won 411,367 or 61.91% of the vote. Both are supported by the Pelangi Coalition which consists of the Gerindra, PKS, Democrats and PBB. While its competitors, Dimas Oky Nugroho (PDIP cadre)-Babai Suhaimi (PKB cadre) who carried PDIP, PAN, PPP, PKB, and Nasdem got 251,367 of the total votes.<sup>75</sup>

PKS's vote acquisition in legislative elections is not always as successful as local head elections. In the 2014 legislative elections, PKS was in third place with 113 thousand votes and managed to obtain 6 seats. The first position was occupied by PDIP with 165 thousand votes with 11 seats and the second position was occupied by Gerindra with 137 thousand votes with 9 seats.

However, in the 2019 legislative elections, PKS shifted PDIP's position. PKS managed to get 50 seats. While PDIP and Gerindra won 10 seats each.<sup>76</sup> In addition to national effects such as the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election, the 212 Movement, and the 2019 presidential election, PKS' victory in Depok was influenced by the policies of the Mayor and PKS which portrayed themselves as parties that care about morality issues. Even though it looks controversial, policies related to LGBT issues and religious local regulations would strengthen the support of PKS cadres and supporters from conservative people.

In the last two decades, PKS elites learned from experiences that made support for the party and power in the executive survive, grow, or shrink. Encouraging policies containing issues of morality and concern for the problems of Muslims is one of the strategies. Even though they received criticism from some civil society organizations and mass media, the policies did not make them defeated in the local head elections. The PKS elite do not believe that strategic confidence can maintain their power. In short, this party's approaches can be considered as immoderation.

In Sukabumi City, PKS succeeded in placing its cadres as mayors in 2018. In the regional head elections, Achmad Fahmi-Andri Setiawan Hamami who was promoted by PKS-Democrat won 84 thousand votes. That vote doubled outperforming its competitor,

---

<sup>75</sup> Detik.com, "Pilkada Kota Depok, KPU Sahkan Idris-Pradi Jadi Pemenang," *Www.Detik.Com*, last modified 2015, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3103421/pilkada-kota-depok-kpu-sahkan-idrispradi-jadi-pemenang>.

<sup>76</sup> Kompas.com, "Geser PDI-P, PKS Kuasai Kursi DPRD Kota Depok," *Www.Kompas.Com*.

Jona Arizona-Hanafie Zain, who was promoted by PDIP-Golkar, with 38 thousand votes.<sup>77</sup> In the 2014 legislative elections, PKS won 3 seats. While most seats were filled by Golkar and PDIP. That number rose to 5 seats in the 2019 legislative election.<sup>78</sup> Gerindra and Golkar won the most seats with 6 seats each. Previously, the city with a population of 356 thousand people was led by cadres from Demokrat (Mohammad Muraz) and Golkar (Muslikh Abdussyukur).

Muslim population in Sukabumi is more diverse than Depok. Some of them are affiliated with traditional and modern mass organizations such as *Persatuan Umat Islam* (the Islamic Community Association [PUI]), NU and Muhammadiyah. Several Islamic organizations and communities that were established after the reformation grew, such as the FPI, HTI, *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement [GPII]), and *Gerakan Penegak Ajaran Allah dan Rasul* (The Movement for Upholding the Teachings of Allah and The Prophet [Gempar]).

Such a socio-religious map might have resulted in PKS in Sukabumi City not getting high votes before 2018. Therefore, PKS needs issues that are more acceptable to the general public in Sukabumi City, without leaving issues that are softer and accepted by the Muslim community. Unlike in Depok, the Mayor of Sukabumi tends to avoid issues that could create an intolerant official's image, while remaining involved in lighter issues.

Fahmi was present at the Solidarity Action in Support of Palestine at Merdeka Square, Sukabumi City on May 23, 2021. He expressed support for Palestinian independence while reminding that the action must be polite and civilized.<sup>79</sup> During his first campaign, Fahmi included the term "religious" in his vision. But the four missions listed do not reflect religious concepts, but are general in

---

<sup>77</sup> Detik.com, "PKS Kuasai Pilkada Serentak Di Kota Sukabumi," *Www.Detik.Com*, last modified 2018, accessed June 22, 2023, <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-4100716/pks-kuasai-pilkada-serentak-di-kota-sukabumi>.

<sup>78</sup> Sukabumikota.go.id, "Sebanyak 35 Anggota DPRD Kota Sukabumi Resmi Dilantik," *Www.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*, last modified 2019, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://portal.sukabumikota.go.id/10424/sebanyak-35-anggota-dprd-kota-sukabumi-resmi-dilantik/>.

<sup>79</sup> Aliansinews.id, "Wali Kota Sukabumi Turut Serta Dalam Aksi Bela Palestina, Apa Kata Wali Kota?," *Www.Aliansinews.Id*, last modified 2021, accessed June 24, 2023, <https://www.aliansinews.id/baca/id/wali-kota-sukabumi-turut-serta-dalam-aksi-bela-palestina-apa-kata-wali-kota>.

nature such as “social solidarity”, “environmental awareness” and “good governance”.

He later put this vision into various regional planning policies such as the Regional Medium-Term Development Plan and the government’s Work Plan. During Fachmi’s era, programs that seemed to support tolerance were developed. For instance, the Program for Strengthening Pancasila Ideology and National Character and the Program for Increasing National Alertness and Quality Improvement and Facilitation of Handling Social Conflicts.<sup>80</sup> During his time, the Ahmadiyya case in Sukabumi did not surface. In 2023, Fahmi issued a policy that was considered discriminatory. He refused a request by the Muhammadiyah Regional Board of Sukabumi City to use Merdeka Square for the Eid al-Fitr prayer.<sup>81</sup>

In Sukabumi City, through their successful cadres who served as Mayors, the PKS elites are more likely chose *strategic confidence* as a step to gain and stay in power through political moderation. In other words, if they remain immoderate, the PKS elite will lose their power.

## Conclusion

Inclusion-moderation among post-Islamism groups and parties is a complex and sometimes non-linear process. Although some academia trying to describe the complexity and dynamics of such issue, the existing studies still look at it at the national level. Not many have explored and compared it to the local level. The study explored the complexity and the dynamics of inclusion-moderation at local level by taking a look at the two cities; Sukabumi and Depok, where the ruling PKS elites have different policy choices. The former chose to be moderate on issues of religious freedom and was considered successful as a Tolerant City while the latter can be referred to as an intolerant city.

Regarding the three explanatory factors (social pressure, organizational structure, and political experience), the PKS elite in the two cities only differed in the political experience factor. The city of Depok has a long history of being in power with the various policies and political steps they have made. This is what made the PKS elite

---

<sup>80</sup> Setara Institute, “Indeks Kota Toleran (IKT) 2022.”

<sup>81</sup> Tempo.co, “Wali Kota Sukabumi Bantah Larang Muhammadiyah Gunakan Lapangan Merdeka Untuk Salat Id,” *Www.Tempo.Co*, last modified 2023, accessed June 23, 2023, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1716076/wali-kota-sukabumi-bantah-larang-muhammadiyah-gunakan-lapang-merdeka-untuk-salat-id>.

choose immoderation. Unlike the Sukabumi. Strategic moderation is the choice to rule or expand power.

This study has limitations in exploring local socio-religious dynamics and internal parties in each region. This challenge has implications for the lack of description of the nuances and complexity of the problems that will affect strategic moderation. This could be the next research agenda.

### **Acknowledgments**

The authors thank Aan Suryana for his valuable and insight. We would also like to thank some students of the Faculty of Social Sciences Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia for their comments and suggestions on the initial draft.

### **References**

- Aliansinews.id. “Wali Kota Sukabumi Turut Serta Dalam Aksi Bela Palestina, Apa Kata Wali Kota?” *Www.Aliansinews.Id*. Last modified 2021. Accessed June 24, 2023. <https://www.aliansinews.id/baca/id/wali-kota-sukabumi-turut-serta-dalam-aksi-bela-palestina-apa-kata-wali-kota>.
- Amnesty International. *Amnesty International Dan Aliansi Jurnalis Independen: Laporan Kepada Sesi Ke-41 Kelompok Kerja UPR (UPR Working Group)*. Jakarta, 2022. <https://www.amnesty.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/UPR-Indonesian.pdf>.
- Antaranews.com. “Pengurus PKS Depok 2020-2025, Siap Tambah Suara Dua Kali Lipat.” *Www.Antaranews.Com*. Last modified 2021. Accessed June 25, 2023. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2011188/pengurus-pks-depok-2020-2025-siap-tambah-suara-dua-kali-lipat>.
- Bayat, Asef. *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*. Oxford University Press, 2013.
- . “Post-Islamism at Large.” In *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, 3–30. Oxford University Press, 2013.
- BBC Indonesia. “Komunitas LGBT ‘melawan’ Pernyataan Wali Kota Depok: ‘Ini Rumah Kami, Saya Harus Bertahan.’” *Www.Bbc.Com*. Last modified January 17, 2020. Accessed April 16, 2023. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-51116965>.
- Buehler, Michael. “Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the

- Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics." *Party Politics* 19, no. 2 (2013): 210–229.
- . "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces." *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 1 (October 1, 2013): 63–82. <http://openurl.ingenta.com/content/xref?genre=article&issn=0010-4159&volume=46&issue=1&spage=63>.
- Bush, Robin. "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?" In *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, edited by Sally White Greg Fealy, 174–191. Pasir Panjang: ISEAS Publishing, 2008.
- CNN Indonesia. "Depok Disebut Kota Intoleran Nomor Dua, PKS Ragukan Riset Setara." *Www.Cnnindonesia.Com*. Last modified 2023. Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230407171122-32-934912/depok-disebut-kota-intoleran-nomor-dua-pks-ragukan-riset-setara>.
- . "Taring PDIP-Gerindra Gagal Robohkan Benteng PKS Di Depok." *Www.Cnnindonesia.Com*.
- Detik.com. "Pilkada Kota Depok, KPU Sahkan Idris–Pradi Jadi Pemenang." *Www.Detik.Com*. Last modified 2015. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3103421/pilkada-kota-depok-kpu-sahkan-idrispradi-jadi-pemenang>.
- . "PKS Jelaskan Definisi Santri Post-Islamisme Sandiaga Uno." *Www.Detik.Com*. Last modified 2018. Accessed June 25, 2023. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4163864/pks-jelaskan-definisi-santri-post-islamisme-sandiaga-uno>.
- . "PKS Kuasai Pilkada Serentak Di Kota Sukabumi." *Www.Detik.Com*. Last modified 2018. Accessed June 22, 2023. <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-4100716/pks-kuasai-pilkada-serentak-di-kota-sukabumi>.
- Fox, Jonathan. "Religious Freedom in Theory and Practice." *Human Rights Review* 16 (2015): 1–22.
- Gerber, Alan S, Donald P Green, and Christopher W Larimer. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *American political Science review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 33–48.

- Hamayotsu, Kikue. "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of Islamist Mobilization in a Muslim Democracy." *Asian Survey* 51, no. 5 (2011): 971–992.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. "New Horizon of Reading Islam and Politics: Post-Islamism in Indonesia." *IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Azazi Manusia* 4, no. 2 (2015).
- Hopkin, Jonathan. "The Comparative Method." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 285–307. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Hoyle, Justin A. "A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post-Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring." *Digest of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 186–209.
- Ismail, Salwa. *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003.
- Ismanu, Muhammad Nuh, and Chusnul Mar'iyah. "Faktor-Faktor Internal Kemenangan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Dalam Pemilihan Anggota DPRD Kota Depok Tahun 2019." *Politicon: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 3, no. 1 (2021): 34–59.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties." *Comparative Politics* (2000): 379–398.
- Katadata.co.id. "Ini Perolehan Suara PKS Dalam Pemilu 1999-2019." *Www.Katadata.Co.Id*. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 23, 2023.  
<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/06/17/ini-perolehan-suara-pks-dalam-pemilu-1999-2019>.
- Kirdiş, Esen. "Similar Contexts, Different Behaviour: Explaining the Non-Linear Moderation and Immoderation of Islamic Political Parties in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* (2019): 1–17.
- Kompas.com. "Geser PDI-P, PKS Kuasai Kursi DPRD Kota Depok." *Www.Kompas.Com*.
- . "Hasil Pemilu 2019: Persentase Suara Dan Jumlah Kursi Parpol." *Www.Kompas.Com*. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 23, 2023.  
<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/06/21/06150031/hasil-pemilu-2019--persentase-suara-dan-jumlah-kursi-parpol>.
- . "PKS: Tifatul Sembiring Kandidat Calon Wali Kota Depok."

- Www.Kompas.Com*. Last modified 2014. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/08/25/12423491/PKS.Tifatul.Sembiring.Kandidat.Calon.Wali.Kota.Depok>.
- . “PKS Kuasai Kursi DPRD Kota Depok.” *Www.Kompas.Coms*. Last modified 2019. Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2019/05/20/06122931/pks-kuasai-kursi-dprd-kota-depok?page=all#:~:text=Jumlah suara PKS di Depok,PDI-P memperoleh 165.479 suara>.
- . “Sederet Alasan Wali Kota Idris Sanggah Depok Kota Paling Intoleran...” *Www.Kompas.Com*. Last modified 2023. Accessed June 4, 2023. <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2023/04/12/10084891/sederet-alasan-wali-kota-idris-sanggah-depok-kota-paling-intoleran?page=all>.
- Kompas.id. “Wali Kota Sukabumi Achmad Fahmi.” *Www.Kompas.Id*. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/tokoh/2022/01/20/wali-kota-sukabumi-achmad-fahmi>.
- Landman, Todd. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. Second. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Lee, Hongseok. “The Implications of Organizational Structure, Political Control, and Internal System Responsiveness on Whistleblowing Behavior.” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 40, no. 1 (2020): 155–177.
- Liputan6.com. “Masjid Ahmadiyah Di Sukabumi Dibakar.” *Www.Liputan6.Com*. Last modified 2008. Accessed June 28, 2023. <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/158551/masjid-ahmadiyah-di-sukabumi-dibakar>.
- Machmudi, Yon. “Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).” ANU Press, 2008.
- Miichi, Ken. “Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues.” *The Muslim World* 110, no. 4 (2020): 589–604.
- OHCHR. “Freedom of Religion.” *Www.Ohchr.Org*. Last modified 2023. Accessed May 3, 2023. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/freedom-religion>.
- Radarsukabumi.com. “Inilah Kepengurusan Baru DPD PKS Kota Sukabumi.” *Www.Radarsukabumi.Com*. Last modified 2020.

- Accessed June 24, 2023. <https://radarsukabumi.com/berita-utama/inilah-kepengurusan-baru-dpd-pks-kota-sukabumi/>.
- Republika.co.id. "Aher Lantik Enam Bupati/Wali Kota Pemenang Pilkada." *Www.Republika.Co.Id*. Last modified 2016. Accessed June 4, 2023. <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/16/02/17/o2odfm301-aher-lantik-enam-bupatiwali-kota-pemenang-pilkada?>
- . "Penggantian Ketua DPD PKS Sukabumi Tak Terkait Partai Gelora." *Www.Republika.Co.Id*. Last modified 2019. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/q151s4428/penggantian-ketua-dpd-pks-sukabumi-tak-terkait-partai-gelora>.
- . "Seribu Massa PKS Sukabumi Dukung Palestina." *Www.Republika.Co.Id*. Last modified 2010. Accessed June 24, 2023. <https://republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nusantara/10/03/21/107399-seribu-massa-pks-sukabumi-dukung-palestina>.
- Roy, Oliver. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Schwedler, Jillian. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 347–376.
- . *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Sekjen DPP PKS. "Anggaran Dasar Dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Keadilan Sejahtera." Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2021. [https://pks.id/dotAsset/fcd26600-66a4-4d26-a265-25cdc3b59165?force\\_download=true](https://pks.id/dotAsset/fcd26600-66a4-4d26-a265-25cdc3b59165?force_download=true).
- Setara Institute. "Indeks Kota Toleran (IKT) 2022." Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2023. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U\\_XseSoHCigJ37iSxXAFOvdSILn\\_BIzz/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U_XseSoHCigJ37iSxXAFOvdSILn_BIzz/view).
- Setiawan, B. "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Mosaik Pluralitas Islam Perkotaan." *Kompas*, no. 24 March (2009): 8.
- Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. *From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia*. Princeton University Press, 2022.
- Snyder, Richard. "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative

- Method.” *Studies in comparative international development* 36 (2001): 93–110.
- Sukabumi Kota. “Kota Sukabumi Raih Penghargaan Kota Toleran Se-Indonesia Peringkat Ke-6.” *Www.Kdp.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*. Last modified 2023. Accessed June 4, 2023. <https://kdp.sukabumikota.go.id/2023/04/kota-sukabumi-raih-penghargaan-kota.html>.
- Sukabumihalojabar.com. “Sukabumi Kota Toleran, Gusdurian Beri Catatan.” *Www.Sukabumihalojabar.Com*. Last modified 2023. Accessed June 24, 2023. <https://sukabumi.halojabar.com/sukabumi-kota-toleran-gusdurian-beri-catatan/>.
- Sukabumikota.go.id. “Berita Acara Penetapan Perolehan Kursi Partai Dan Calon Terpilih Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kota Sukabumi.” *Wwww.Portal.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*. Last modified 2019. Accessed June 4, 2023. <https://portal.sukabumikota.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BA-055-CAP.pdf>.
- . “Sebanyak 35 Anggota DPRD Kota Sukabumi Resmi Dilantik.” *Www.Sukabumikota.Go.Id*. Last modified 2019. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://portal.sukabumikota.go.id/10424/sebanyak-35-anggota-dprd-kota-sukabumi-resmi-dilantik/>.
- Sukabumiupdate.com. “Bakorpakem: Penutupan Masjid Bilal Ahmadiyah Kota Sukabumi Kewenangan Pusat.” *Www.Sukabumiupdate.Com*. Last modified 2017. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://www.sukabumiupdate.com/peristiwa/29481/bakorpakem-penutupan-masjid-bilal-ahmadiyah-kota-sukabumi-kewenangan-pusat>.
- Tempo.co. “Perda Kota Religius Kota Depok Ditolak, Pemprov Jawa Barat Sudah Beri Sinyal Sejak Januari.” *Www.Tempo.Co*. Last modified 2022. Accessed April 16, 2023. <https://metro.tempo.co/read/1641537/perda-kota-religius-kota-depok-ditolak-pemprov-jawa-barat-sudah-beri-sinyal-sejak-januari>.
- . “Wali Kota Sukabumi Bantah Larang Muhammadiyah Gunakan Lapang Merdeka Untuk Salat Id.” *Www.Tempo.Co*. Last modified 2023. Accessed June 23, 2023.

- <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1716076/wali-kota-sukabumi-bantah-larang-muhammadiyah-gunakan-lapang-merdeka-untuk-salat-id>.
- Tezcür, Günes Murat. "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors." *Party Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 69–88.
- Tomsa, Dirk. "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party." *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2012): 486–498.
- Tribunnews.com. "Tolak Harga BBM Naik, PKS Depok Gelar Flashmob Di 11 Titik, Dibentangkan Di Jalan Merdeka Sukmajaya." *Www.Tribunesw.Com*. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 23, 2023. <https://depok.tribunnews.com/2022/09/10/tolak-harga-bbm-naik-pks-depok-gelar-flashmob-di-11-titik-dibentangkan-di-jalan-merdeka-sukmajaya>.
- US Embassy Indonesia. *2017 International Religious Freedom Report*. Jakarta, 2017. <https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/official-reports/2017-international-religious-freedom-report/>.
- VOI. "Hampir 20 Tahun PKS Berkuasa Di Depok, Charta Politika Ungkap Analisisnya." *Www.Voi.Id*. Last modified 2020. Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://voi.id/berita/22543/hampir-20-tahun-pks-berkuasa-di-depok-charta-politika-ungkap-analisisnya>.
- Wahid, Abdurrahman. *Ilusi Negara Islam*. Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009.
- Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* (2004): 205–228.
- Wuthrich, F Michael, and Sabri Ciftci. "Islamist Parties, Intraparty Organizational Dynamics, and Moderation as Strategic Behaviour." *Mediterranean Politics* (2020): 1–23.
- Yilmaz, Ihsan. "Post-Secularism, Post-Islamism and Islam in the Public Sphere." *Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East*. Leuven University Press, 2014.